How should Liberal perfectionists justify the state? by Mills, Christopher E.
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Mills, Chris. (2017) How should Liberal perfectionists justify the state? Moral Philosophy and 
Politics, 4 (1). pp. 43-65. 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/91071  
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
“The final publication is available at www.degruyter.com”. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/mopp-
2016-0035    
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
1 
 
How Should Liberal Perfectionists Justify the State? 
Moral Philosophy and Politics 4, no. 1 (2017): 43-65. 
Abstract 
Liberal institutions should respect citizens as autonomous agents. But what does this 
mandate require and how should it shape the demands of liberal legitimacy? I trace the 
contemporary disagreement between liberal perfectionist and anti-perfectionist 
accounts of legitimacy back to this requirement to respect the autonomy of citizens in 
order to weigh up how well each approach fulfils this mandate. I argue that further 
reflection over the nature of respect for the value of personal autonomy gives liberals 
reason to favour moderate forms of perfectionism and be sceptical of criticisms of 
perfectionism grounded in concerns over respect. 
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Liberal thinkers have long recognised that the concept of autonomy plays a central role 
in our understanding of legitimate political institutions. Although a belief in the 
importance of individual self-government is by no means uncontroversial, this belief is 
widely held (either implicitly or explicitly) in broad swathes of liberal thinking.1 We find 
its most comprehensive defence in Joseph Raz’s The Morality of Freedom, where Raz 
situates the value of personal autonomy at the heart of a robust and pluralistic form of 
perfectionism. Raz’s theory of autonomy is well-known and influential, as are the 
pressing criticisms against his perfectionism offered by theorists who emphasise the 
diversity of conflicting but reasonably-held conceptions of the good life that we find in 
liberal societies. Not all of these views are compatible with the comprehensive value of 
personal autonomy when conceived in terms that are thick enough to ground a robust 
form of perfectionism. This leads liberal perfectionists and their anti-perfectionist critics 
to inevitable conflict over the precise role that autonomy should play in the justification 
of the liberal state. Both traditions believe that it should play some role, but what role 
should it play? 
                                                          
1 For more on the background of this dispute, see Christman 2015. 
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This article is an invitation for liberal perfectionists to return back to justificatory basics 
and consider a new answer to this question. The conflict between perfectionist and anti-
perfectionist liberals is well-known, firmly established, and pervasive. Prior attempts by 
liberal perfectionists to reconceive the justification of their approach in response to this 
conflict have proven productive (e.g. Metz 2001; Wall 2010). This article proceeds in a 
similar vein. My argument is partially interpretive and partially constructive. In what 
follows, I suggest a framework for how perfectionists should understand the 
requirements of liberal legitimacy (§ 1). I use this framework to diagnose the relevant 
points of disagreement between perfectionists and anti-perfectionists, and the well-
known impasse that this disagreement creates (§ 2). I then propose a novel solution to 
this impasse that centres on the value of personal autonomy itself, rather than on 
autonomy’s relationship with objective value pluralism or reasonable pluralistic 
disagreement (§3). I argue that respect for the value of personal autonomy is more 
compatible with perfectionism than anti-perfectionism (§4). I conclude from this that 
defences of anti-perfectionism as a requirement for respecting citizens as free and equal 
moral agents are morally costlier than they initially appear (§5). 
 
This defence of perfectionism is more voluntarist and autonomy-focussed than Raz’s 
traditional value-based defence of liberal perfectionism. As a result, this argument should 
be more persuasive to sceptics than the traditional Razian defence. This is because, 
although anti-perfectionists are happy to deny comprehensive value claims any 
significant role in the justification of constitutional essentials, both perfectionist and anti-
perfectionist liberals accept that the legitimate liberal state must acknowledge the value 
of personal autonomy to some degree. Each view gives this value a different justificatory 
role to play in their account of legitimacy. My approach explores the consequences of 
these differing roles. By identifying the costs involved in supporting anti-perfectionism 
in terms that both parties recognise (although differ in the weight that they assign to 
these costs), I hope that my argument offers a further thread to perfectionism that is 
better suited to persuade sceptics of the compatibility between liberalism and 
perfectionism. 
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1. The Traditional Problem 
 
In order to see the impasse between perfectionist and anti-perfectionist liberals, we must 
begin with the preceding question – what makes a liberal state legitimate? In order to 
answer this question, perfectionist liberals should acknowledge that any explanation of 
liberal political legitimacy is a subclass of the broader notion of legitimate political 
authority that is subject to further distinctly liberal constraints. Every state that satisfies 
the conditions of liberal political legitimacy will satisfy the conditions of political 
authority. However, many illiberal states will satisfy the latter without satisfying the 
former. This simple conceptual point requires our argument to meet two conditions: 
First, the state must satisfy the conceptual demands of legitimate political authority. 
Second, the state must meet further moral constraints on the scope of legitimate political 
action in order to satisfy the demands of liberal legitimacy.  
 
Raz outlines the conceptual requirements of legitimate political authority in his well-
known ‘Service Conception’ of authority. This theory seeks to answer the central problem 
of authority – how can one possess the right to rule, and in doing so, impose duties on 
others simply by expressing the intention to create those duties? The service conception 
answers this problem by suggesting that authorities mediate between subjects and the 
right reasons that apply to them (Raz 1996, p. 214). For example, doctors and nurses 
serve as medical authorities by caring for their patients in line with medical knowledge 
and parents serve as parental authorities by raising their children in line with the 
requirements of a good upbringing.  
 
Legitimate authorities are institutions that are able to serve this purpose effectively in a 
pre-emptive manner. This feature of authority is captured by three theses: 
 
Dependence – all authoritative directives should be based on reasons that 
already independently apply to the subjects of the directives and that are 
relevant to their behaviour in the circumstances covered by the directive (Raz 
1986, p. 47). 
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Normal Justification – the alleged subject is likely to better comply with those 
dependent reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative 
directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as 
authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow 
the reasons which apply to him directly (Raz 1986, p. 53).  
 
Pre-Emption – the reasons provided by the commands of a legitimate authority 
both constitute first-order reasons for subjects and serve as reasons to 
disregard the independent reasons that they pre-empt (Raz 1986, p. 59). 
 
Pre-Emption allows us to say that an authority enjoys the right to rule when it’s 
commands both exclude and replace a subject’s antecedent reasons. This allows us to 
distinguish between legitimate and mere de facto authorities as the latter’s orders will 
not pre-empt a subject’s antecedent reasons in this way. Mere de facto authorities only 
appear to enjoy the right to rule.  
 
Normal Justification explains the most common (but not the sole) manner by which 
authorities gain legitimacy - by excelling at their function.2 Authorities often legitimate 
themselves by mediating between subjects and the right reasons that are relevant to 
them in a manner that makes it likelier that subjects will better comply with those 
reasons. Dependence, in turn, limits the scope of a legitimate authority to antecedent 
reasons that apply independently of the authority’s commands. 
 
These three theses offer us a conceptual model of legitimacy that applies to a wide range 
of different types of authority.3 It is for this reason that the service conception remains 
silent on the moral challenge that liberals pursue – how can a political state wield the 
                                                          
2 For more on the incompleteness of the service conception, see Raz 2010, p. 298. 
3 For further useful discussion of the service conception, see: Hershovitz 2003; Raz 2006; Himma 2007; Raz 
2009; Darwall 2010; Quong 2011, pp. 108-36; Sherman 2010; Viehoff 2011. 
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right to rule in a manner that is compatible with the moral equality and presumptive 
freedom that liberal citizens should enjoy? Liberals agree that political institutions can 
be justified. However, they disagree about how we should justify the liberal state. That is, 
what justifies distinctly liberal policies?  
 
Perfectionists can use the service conception as a framework to interpret the arguments 
provided by the social contract tradition. Doing so suggests that the reasons that the 
liberal state legitimately pre-empts must be nested in our general moral reasons to 
recognise citizens as free and equal autonomous agents. We enjoy autonomy in the 
absence of constraints on our actions, and so the justification of any constraints 
(including those imposed by political institutions) must give us reasons that can outweigh 
the value of the autonomy lost due to those constraints. If the moral legitimacy of the 
liberal state’s authority to coerce citizens is premised on the state’s ability to respect 
citizens as autonomous agents, then the reasons upon which the liberal state’s authority 
should depend must be provided by some form of moral recognition respect for 
autonomy.4 
 
For the purposes of this argument, we can characterise the requirement that the 
legitimate liberal state must respect the autonomy of citizens as generating the following 
three further conditions: 
 
Recognition - The liberal state must treat citizens as presumptively free and 
equal in their possession of the capacity for autonomy. Citizens are moral 
equals in the sense that we all possess the minimal capacities for autonomous 
agency, and we are presumptively free because there is no natural authority 
that we are obliged to serve without good reason.  
 
                                                          
4 For more on the nature of moral recognition respect, see Darwall 1977, pp. 36-49; Darwall 2006, pp. 119-
47. 
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Justification - These characteristics create a justificatory burden that must be 
met whenever one agent (or group of agents) restricts another’s autonomous 
pursuit of his or her conception of the good. When one moral equal restricts 
the freedom of another moral equal, they must provide those affected with 
compelling reasons for doing so in order to acknowledge their equal status. 
 
Voluntarism – A constraint on our freedom is not morally objectionable when 
those affected could or do autonomously consent to that restriction. So long as 
the state allows citizens the opportunity to autonomously consent (either 
explicitly, tacitly, or hypothetically) to its actions, then the state can meet its 
justificatory burden in a way that respects the status of citizens as autonomous 
agents by providing citizens with reasons that are compatible with that status. 
 
This set of conditions is not exhaustive and is not intended to be endorsed by all self-
identifying liberals.5 Rather, these conditions set further constraints on the actions of 
legitimate political authorities by giving additional moral content to Normal Justification 
and Dependence. By doing so, these conditions offer us just one possible explanation of 
the conditions that a perfectionist state must meet to become liberally legitimate. The 
liberal state acts legitimately when its coercive efforts coordinate the behaviour of 
citizens so that each citizen can pursue her conception of the good in a way that is 
compatible with respecting the autonomy of her fellow citizens. In turn, the moral status 
of citizens as autonomous agents constrains the actions of the legitimate liberal state so 
that if the state’s commands contravene or disregard the autonomy of its citizens without 
good reason, then it undermines its own claim to being able to coerce citizens in a 
legitimate manner.  
 
Fulfilling these three further conditions will allow an authority to establish itself as 
legitimate in line with the distinctive autonomy-sensitive demands of liberalism. Not only 
will the authority in question coordinatively benefit citizens by coercing them in a 
manner that allows them to better pursue their own conception of the good while 
                                                          
5 For a compelling alternative, see Quong 2011: 14-15. 
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respecting the autonomy of their fellow citizens, but it will also provide citizens with 
reasons that satisfactorily justify the coercion necessary for this benefit.  
 
2. The Contemporary Disagreement  
 
The above framework suggests that liberal perfectionists are searching for an argument 
that satisfies Normal Justification that can also satisfy the demands of Recognition, 
Justification, and Voluntarism. Such an argument would provide perfectionists with a 
better understanding of the principled limits of liberal state coercion. The contemporary 
debate between perfectionist and anti-perfectionist liberals can be seen to emerge out of 
the moral quagmire of this search. Specifically, there are various reasonable 
interpretations of the constraints that liberal legitimacy places on political institutions. 
While it is true that states which satisfy these conditions can reasonably claim to be 
liberal, different branches of liberal theory disagree over what the state must do in order 
to satisfy these conditions, how strict these conditions are, the content of the resulting 
laws that the liberal state may legitimately enact, and more. Perfectionists can interpret 
this disagreement as concerning the question of how the requirement to recognise and 
respect the autonomous agency of citizens should inform liberal political and legal 
institutions (Dworkin 1985, p. 191). Perfectionist liberals believe that the value of 
personal autonomy should guide policy prescriptions due to the structure of liberal 
society. In contrast, anti-perfectionist liberals believe that political autonomy should play 
this role.  In this section, I employ the preceding framework to explain the main points of 
contention between liberal perfectionists and liberal anti-perfectionists, and the impasse 
that these contentions have created. 
 
2.1 Liberal Perfectionist Legitimacy 
 
Perfectionists accept one of the following two claims: 
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Negative Thesis – ‘…there is no fundamental principled inhibition on 
governments acting for any valid moral reason.’ (Raz 1989, p. 1230). 
 
Positive Thesis – ‘…political authorities should take an active role in creating 
and maintaining social conditions that best enable their subjects to lead 
valuable and worthwhile lives.’ (Wall 1996, p. 8). 
 
There are many reasons to accept that political policies can be justified on perfectionist 
grounds. The most prominent reason for accepting perfectionism is: 
 
Inseparability - our moral reasons and our ethical considerations flow from the 
same source: our reasons for action grounded in a range of incommensurable 
competitively plural objective values (Raz 1986, pp. 313-20).6  
 
Inseparability is a conceptual claim about the nature of our practical reasons according to 
which our reasons for action flow from values in such a way as to make these values 
relevant to our moral claims. Our reasons for action track values and so, when we reason 
about how to act, we seek to pursue value. This pursuit of value is then constrained by 
our moral rights and duties because we have good moral reasons to act in morally 
acceptable ways. Further, those reasons themselves reference value claims. Hence, we 
commonly combine notions of the right and the good when we act.  
 
Perfectionists argue that the truth of this conceptual claim should lead us to design 
policies that straddle both moral and ethical spheres. If political legitimacy is a question 
of coordinating subjects to better comply with their antecedent reasons, and those 
reasons do not distinguish between the right and the good, then it is the legitimate 
function of the state to coordinate citizens in their pursuit of value subject to the relevant 
moral constraints. Consequently, perfectionists believe that our political duties can range 
                                                          
6 See also Griffin 1986, pp. 155-62; Raz 1996, pp. 3-16; Raz 1999, pp. 303-332; Wall 1996, ch’s 2-5; Wallace 
2004. 
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over both the right and the good. We have no principled reason to restrain politics to only 
one sphere. Justice, properly conceived, must reference the flourishing of citizens.  
 
Inseparability can inform many perfectionist accounts of legitimacy. The challenge for 
liberal perfectionists is to prove that Inseparability is consistent with key liberal values.7 
Raz answers this challenge with: 
 
Social Forms – liberal social structures require citizens to possess some 
capacity of personal autonomy in order to benefit from the valuable options 
available to them (Raz 1986, pp. 307-13).8 
 
Contingent Value – the value of personal autonomy is contingent on the 
objective value or moral character of the goals that we autonomously pursue 
(Raz 1986, pp. 378-81).9  
 
These theses require states coordinating citizens in discharging their perfectionist duties 
to do so in ways that are compatible with the value of personal autonomy (Social Forms). 
The liberal state owes it to citizens to facilitate their living good lives and succeeding at 
this within liberal society requires the capacity for autonomy.  Personal autonomy is 
morally valuable for this reason. As a result, we each have moral reasons to help ourselves 
and others to live autonomous lives (Raz 1986, p. 407).  
 
However, personal autonomy is not unconditionally valuable as it is only valuable if 
exercised in the pursuit of independently valuable ends (Contingent Value). Hence, 
respect for the moral equality and presumptive freedom of citizens requires the state to 
                                                          
7 Jonathan Quong provides us with a precise formulation of this claim in his Liberal Perfectionist Thesis: ‘It 
is at least sometimes permissible for a liberal state to promote or discourage particular activities, ideals, or 
ways of life on grounds relating to their inherent or intrinsic value, or on the basis of other metaphysical 
claims.’ (Quong 2011, p. 27). 
8 See also, Wall 1996: 166-7; Wall 2010: 237. For criticism, see McCabe 2001. 
9 See also, Wall 1996: 144. For criticism, see Lecce 2008, p. 130; Quong 2011, p. 60. 
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support a range of valuable opportunities for citizens to pursue. A failure to provide these 
opportunities would disrespect citizens as agents capable of enjoying these opportunities 
autonomously. Conversely, the state’s failure to support valueless or disvaluable 
opportunities does not restrict any freedom that autonomous agents can benefit from.  
 
These theses establish a version of perfectionism that is sensitive to the demands of 
autonomy and is capable of satisfying the requirements of liberal legitimacy. To 
summarise, this argument takes the following form: 
 
1. Citizens possess moral duties toward each other that contain perfectionist 
requirements to help others live good lives (Inseparability).  
 
2. The liberal perfectionist state can better coordinate citizens to discharge these duties 
(Dependence & Normal Justification).  
 
3. This grants the perfectionist state the right to rule (Pre-Emption). 
 
4. Coercion (e.g. taxation) required for this coordination is compatible with autonomy 
and can be justified to citizens according to autonomy’s moral value (Social Forms & 
Contingent Value).  
 
5. Thus, the liberal perfectionist state can treat citizens as presumptively free and equal 
autonomous agents by providing them with weighty moral reasons that they should 
accept as autonomous agents in order to justify this coercion (Recognition, 
Justification, and Voluntarism). 
 
2.2 Why Anti-Perfectionists are not Perfectionists 
 
Interpreted in this way, we can see how the above argument has been subject to a number 
of important criticisms by liberals who deny that liberalism is compatible with 
perfectionism (e.g. Lecce 2008; Quong 2011). Anti-perfectionists often deny that liberal 
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perfectionism can satisfy the demands of liberal legitimacy because it places too great a 
value on personal autonomy.10 Following John Rawls’ pioneering work, we can describe 
the challenge to liberal perfectionism in the preceding framework’s terms as follows: the 
state should treat citizens as presumptively free and equal (Recognition). However, the 
state should do so in a way that is informed by the fact of reasonable pluralism (Rawls 
2005, p. 36). According to this premise, when a state secures basic liberal rights and 
freedoms, it also creates the social and political circumstances that generate a great 
diversity of reasonable and irreconcilably conflicting doctrines of belief (Rawls 2005, pp. 
12-4).  
 
Rawls names the source of this reasonable pluralism the ‘Burdens of Judgement’ (Rawls 
2005, pp. 54-8). These burdens give rise to a plurality of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines.11 This plurality creates difficulties for liberals over how to resolve conflicts 
between these views without resorting to the oppressive use of force (and becoming a 
form of sectarian state). Rawls’ solution is to turn away from grounding liberalism in one 
comprehensive doctrine amongst many. He does this by interpreting Justification far 
more narrowly than his predecessors. Citizens cannot simply provide sound 
comprehensive reasons to justify state coercion because the soundness of those reasons 
does not prevent their comprehensive character from creating reasonable disagreement. 
Coercing citizens according to sound but reasonably controversial reasons fails to respect 
their status as political co-legislators in the face of the burdens of judgement. Thus, 
coercing citizens on these grounds fails to respect them as moral equals.  
 
In order to avoid this pernicious form of disrespect, citizens must appeal to public reasons 
when justifying the constitutional essentials of their society. Public reasons allow citizens 
‘…to conduct their fundamental discussions within the framework of what each regards 
as a political conception of justice based on values that others can reasonably be expected 
                                                          
10 Not all anti-perfectionists reject liberal perfectionism for this reason. In what follows, I set aside so-called 
convergence justifications of anti-perfectionism (e.g. Gaus 2011, 283-292) as more concerned with 
epistemic arguments for anti-perfectionism than autonomy-based arguments.  
11 Comprehensive doctrines appeal to conceptions of what is of value in human life for their justificatory 
weight. In contrast, political (i.e. non-comprehensive) doctrines can be both derived from comprehensive 
doctrines and justified independently from such value claims. Accepting a political doctrine does not 
presuppose the acceptance of any specific comprehensive doctrine. 
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to endorse and each is, in good faith, prepared to defend that conception so understood’ 
(Rawls 2005, p. 226). Restricting Justification to the realm of public reason means that 
citizens should not appeal to sound but reasonably controversial reasons when justifying 
central acts of political legislation. This restriction establishes Rawls’ well-known 
principle of liberal legitimacy: ‘Our exercise of political power is proper only when we 
sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions – were we to 
state them as government officials – are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that 
other citizens might reasonably accept those reasons.’ (Rawls 2005, 446-7). 
 
So, according to anti-perfectionists, the burdens of judgement should inform how 
Recognition generates Justification. The justificatory burden generated by the liberal 
requirement to recognise citizens as free and equal autonomous agents should be 
sensitive to background features against which this burden is satisfied. Responding to the 
fact of reasonable pluralism by restricting the range of acceptable reasons has three 
important consequences for political legitimacy:  
 
First, it leads anti-perfectionist versions of liberalism to prioritise the right over 
comprehensive forms of the good. Rawls conceives of political and ethical claims as 
complimentary because the successful justification of political principles will draw upon 
certain value judgments in order to weigh conflicting public reasons. However, these 
value judgements must belong to a reasonable political conception of justice. That is, they 
must be shareable by all citizens and not presuppose any particular comprehensive 
doctrine for their justificatory weight (Rawls 2005, pp. 174-6).12 
 
Second, this priority establishes an anti-perfectionist restriction on political legitimacy of 
the sort that perfectionists explicitly reject. As we have seen, perfectionists deny any 
principled separation between the right and the good in the fundamental duties of 
citizens (Inseparability). The priority of the right over the good that is established by 
appealing to public reason prevents Inseparability from significantly shaping political 
morality. This conflicts with the perfectionist’s belief that sound comprehensive value 
                                                          
12 See also Ahlberg 2015. 
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claims can play a legitimate role in shaping political morality. For this reason, 
perfectionists cannot accept the degree to which Rawls prioritises the right over the good 
in response to the fact of reasonable pluralism. This priority is antithetical to the 
perfectionist duties that liberal perfectionists believe should motivate political discourse. 
 
Third, this priority has important ramifications for how anti-perfectionists interpret 
Voluntarism. According to this constraint, the liberal state must meet its justificatory 
burden in a way that respects the status of citizens as autonomous agents (i.e. by 
providing citizens with reasons that are compatible with that status). Liberal 
perfectionists justify the promotion of valuable opportunities as compatible with the 
autonomy of citizens because they argue: (i) that citizens have reason to pursue value, 
(ii) that the pursuit of value in liberal society requires the capacities for personal 
autonomy, and (iii) that successful autonomous action is only valuable if the opportunity 
pursued is itself independently valuable. If these claims are true, then perfectionist 
policies aimed at improving the lives of citizens can be justified to citizens in a way that 
reflects their status as agents who enjoy the capacities for personal autonomy. 
 
Anti-perfectionists interpret Voluntarism more narrowly than their perfectionist cousins. 
According to anti-perfectionists, the state should aim at helping citizens to enjoy 
autonomy in a ‘political’, rather than ‘ethical’, sense (Rawls 2005, pp. 77-8). Political 
autonomy consists of the ‘…legal independence and integrity of citizens and their sharing 
equally with others in the exercise of political power’ (Rawls 2005, pp. 455-6). This differs 
substantially from the ethical notion of personal autonomy that perfectionists have in 
mind.13 Citizens can enjoy political autonomy even if they dismiss the ethical value of 
living a personally autonomous life. The fact that citizens enjoy the capacity for personal 
autonomy (as a moral power) is one consideration in favour of securing political 
autonomy for them. But there are competing considerations that should play a role in 
informing our political institutions.  
 
                                                          
13 For more on this distinction, see Wall 2015, pp. 164-9. 
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As a result, personal autonomy must be stripped of much of its comprehensive value if it 
is to play a role in a political system shaped by reasonable pluralism. This means that the 
anti-perfectionist state is obliged to secure the mere capacities for autonomous agency 
as the moral power to form and revise a conception of the good, without also promoting 
valuable opportunities for citizens to enjoy autonomously (Rawls 2005, p. 81). When it 
comes to understanding how anti-perfectionists conceive of autonomy, the political 
simply cannot be personal.  
 
In summary, the disagreement between perfectionist and anti-perfectionist liberals leads 
anti-perfectionists to accept Recognition but interpret Justification and Voluntarism far 
more narrowly than perfectionists because they believe that Recognition must 
acknowledge the burdens of judgement. This difference rests upon a fundamental 
disagreement over the content of the duties that motivate political morality. 
Perfectionists believe that citizens owe it to each other to help them lead flourishing lives 
as autonomous agents, and that the state gains its legitimacy by coordinating citizens to 
discharge these duties more efficiently than they otherwise would. Anti-perfectionists 
disagree, rejecting the claim that political duties can directly concern themselves with 
comprehensive accounts of flourishing (given the fact of reasonable pluralism). This 
disagreement creates: 
 
The Impasse: Liberal perfectionist accounts of legitimacy assume the 
existence of a set of fundamental (perfectionist) moral duties that anti-
perfectionists reject. 
 
3. An Autonomy-First Solution? 
 
Having traced the contemporary disagreement between perfectionist and anti-
perfectionist liberals from the traditional problem of liberal political legitimacy, we have 
a clearer view of the impasse at which the two parties stand. The consequences of this 
impasse are considerable: perfectionist liberals believe that the demands of political 
legitimacy require citizens to be respected as presumptively free and equal personally 
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autonomous agents. In contrast, anti-perfectionist liberals believe that citizens should be 
respected as free and equal agents who enjoy political autonomy. The latter trades off the 
comprehensive value of personal autonomy for other political gains against the 
background created by the burdens of judgement.  
 
While much impressive work has been done on the relative plausibility of various 
defences of perfectionism and anti-perfectionism, I believe that tracing the contemporary 
debate back to its roots in this way offers perfectionists important insights that are 
sensitive to the nature of the impasse that they face. This backtracking allows us to situate 
both traditions in the broader debate over how the moral requirements to recognise and 
respect the autonomy of citizens should inform our institutions. This, in turn, allows us a 
better understanding of the benefits and costs of different accounts of Justification and 
Voluntarism. 
 
Specifically, by putting the requirements of autonomy ahead of those of objective value 
or reasonable pluralism, perfectionists afford themselves a more persuasive standard of 
comparison. This standard is relatively neutral because both approaches claim to respect 
the value of autonomy. Liberals of both stripes accept that the state should recognise 
citizens as autonomous agents but they disagree over how this recognition should inform 
Justification and Voluntarism. Perfectionists acknowledge and embrace the ethical 
qualities of personal autonomy, while anti-perfectionists disregard these qualities in 
order to establish political autonomy for citizens. 
 
Framing the disagreement in this way allows perfectionists to appeal to the concept of 
autonomy in order to better understand the benefits and costs of different accounts of 
Justification and Voluntarism. To do so, we can ask: how should the moral requirements 
to recognise and respect the autonomous agency of citizens inform liberal institutions? 
Perfectionist and anti-perfectionist liberals differ in their answers to this question in the 
following way:  
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Liberal perfectionists value personal autonomy as a social requirement for living a 
successful life in liberal society. They can defend the claim that respect for personal 
autonomy requires the state to guarantee that citizens enjoy both the capacity to form 
and revise our autonomous conceptions of the good and the likelihood of successfully 
pursuing those conceptions (Capacity & Success).  
 
In contrast, liberal anti-perfectionists value personal autonomy as a moral power - a 
central part of the reasonable moral psychology used to model the difficulties of publicly 
justifying a legitimate system of rules that can satisfy the demands of justice under 
conditions of reasonable pluralism. It follows from this that anti-perfectionists can 
defend the narrower claim that respect for autonomy requires us to guarantee the 
capacity to form and revise an autonomous conception of the good without supporting 
actual opportunities for successful autonomous action (Capacity Without Success). 
 
Foregrounding this distinction allows us to consider which of these explanations of the 
demands of respect for personal autonomy is more plausible and less costly.14 As we have 
seen, both theories accept that liberal legitimacy requires the state to recognise citizens 
as free and equal autonomous agents. Further, both theories take this requirement to 
mean that the value of personal autonomy should play some role in justifying liberal 
policies (either as a comprehensive value or as a moral power). By taking an autonomy-
first approach, we can compare Capacity & Success to Capacity Without Success in order 
to better understand which approach best reflects the character of personal autonomy. If 
one approach mishandles this character, then it is costlier (in terms of personal 
autonomy) than the other. Such costs generate a presumptive reason against the 
offending view that liberals on both sides should recognise. 
                                                          
14 It should be noted that the difference between Capacity & Success and Capacity Without Success is not one 
that is easily captured by the distinction between protecting and promoting personal autonomy, with the 
former generating negative duties of non-interference and the latter generating positive duties of 
enablement. Though initially attractive, this distinction is too simplistic. Anti-perfectionists are willing to 
interfere with a wide range of unreasonable autonomous decisions and perfectionists are unlikely to enable 
disvaluable autonomous choices. Further, we can protect or promote the capacity for autonomous action 
independently from protecting or promoting the likelihood of success of acting from this capacity. The 
distinction I offer is intended to cut across these various considerations, each of which is part of (but not 
the complete) meaning that we should concern ourselves with. I thank an anonymous reviewer for 
encouraging me to clarify this thought further. 
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4. Personal Autonomy and Liberal Perfectionism 
 
In this section, I argue that proper respect for personal autonomy requires us to value 
and protect a particular type of self-reflective self-controlled behaviour. This gives us 
reason to provide those capable of this valuable form of behaviour with both the 
capacities and opportunities to succeed in this behaviour. This is because the 
motivational profile of personal autonomy gives us reasons to believe that the concept 
has a ‘success condition’.15 If autonomous agents are to enjoy the value of personal 
autonomy, they must succeed in behaving autonomously. This necessary condition 
requires political institutions looking to respect the value of acting autonomously to 
provide sufficient opportunities to succeed in acting in this way (Capacity & Success). 
Failing to do so will frustrate the motivational qualities that lend autonomy its value.   
 
It follows that Capacity Without Success arguments fail to acknowledge that the value of 
personal autonomy comes from successful autonomous behaviour. As a result, some anti-
perfectionist policies will risk actively frustrating the valuable phenomenon of 
autonomous motivation. In contrast, perfectionists who support Capacity & Success are 
better placed to correctly acknowledge and avoid frustrating this value by promoting 
worthwhile opportunities for citizens to autonomously pursue. This outcome suggests 
that anti-perfectionism’s support for political autonomy is costlier than it initially 
appears. This cost gives liberals seeking to respect autonomy reason to believe that 
liberal perfectionism better respects the qualities that make personal autonomy valuable 
than its anti-perfectionist rival.  
 
4.1 Autonomy and Motivation 
 
When we respect something, we recognise the source of its value and respond 
accordingly (Raz 2001, pp. 160-4). Respecting other people as autonomous requires us 
                                                          
15 I owe this turn of phrase to Ben Colburn. 
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to recognise and respond to the source of personal autonomy’s value. The source of 
personal autonomy’s value is the psychological notion of autonomous agency.16 A 
person’s ability to act according to her own will gives purpose to our capacities for 
reason-responsive rationality, reflective endorsement, and self-conscious prudential 
reasoning that we use to form, revise, and successfully pursue our conception of the good.  
 
These capacities inform Raz’s canonical statement on the issue: ‘The ruling idea behind 
the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should make their own lives. The 
autonomous person is a (part) author of his own life. The ideal of personal autonomy is 
the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through 
successive decisions throughout their lives’ (Raz 1986, p. 369). The value of these 
capacities explains liberalism’s ability to ground its commitments to equality and 
freedom in respect for personal autonomy. Insofar as any agent possesses these valuable 
capacities, they are morally equal. The value of these capacities then gives us a 
presumptive reason to secure independence and freedom for our fellow agents to enjoy 
(Raz 1986, pp. 377-8). 
 
If autonomous agents are to exhibit Raz’s sense of control over the narrative of their lives 
then they must take an active role in shaping their own life by conceiving of and pursuing 
opportunities that they value. This control requires autonomous agents to be more than 
a mere passive bystander toward their motivations for action (Frankfurt 1998, p. 54).17 
This agential control is the source of autonomy’s value as this control is necessary for an 
agent to successfully act according to her will. We act according to our will when we 
motivate ourselves to act in a manner that reflects our authentic self-conception and our 
reflectively endorsed commitments.18  
 
                                                          
16 For criticism, see Garnett 2013; Garnett 2014. 
17 For an explanation of Raz’s conception of autonomy as distinctly separate from Frankfurt’s motivational 
model, see Colburn 2010, pp. 9-19. 
18 Raz links autonomy to integrity in a similar way (Raz 1986, pp. 382-3). 
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Acting in this way is valuable for two reasons: When an agent acts in this way, she pursues 
the values that she endorses and shapes the world according to her will. This is the 
external source of autonomy’s value. Additionally, when an agent acts in this way, she also 
exhibits control over her commitments and self-conception. This is the internal source of 
autonomy’s value.19 
 
Locating the source of autonomy in the relationship between a particular type of self-
controlling agency and our own identity has the important consequence of ensuring that 
not all motivations are formed equal. Some motivations reflect this relationship better 
than others. Motivations that reflect the agent’s authentic will can motivate autonomous 
action, whereas motivations that fail to reflect our authentic will can threaten 
heteronomous action. By avoiding heteronomy, authentic motivation for action better 
instantiates both the external and internal values of autonomous agency.20 
 
Seen in this way, the notion of authenticity can explain autonomy’s value through our 
motivational states. It is this relationship between autonomy and motivation that gives 
us reason to believe that respect for autonomy is best conceived of as requiring the 
conditions for successful autonomous action. This is because motivations are not mental 
phenomena that reside silently within us. Rather, motivating phenomena motivate us to 
action. Thus, recognition for the autonomy of another agent means that we must help 
them to form, revise and successfully pursue their conception of the good. We cannot 
adequately respect the autonomy of our fellow citizens by just helping them to form a 
conception of the good. Doing so would ignore the fact that conceptions of the good guide 
us to authentically motivated autonomous action.  
                                                          
19 For further discussion of the process of identification, see Bratman 1996; Frankfurt 1998, pp. 103-4. 
Velleman 2002; Ekstrom 2005. For further defence of the value of personal autonomy in terms of agential 
identification, see Hurka 1987; Korsgaard 2009. I thank an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion that 
Frankfurt himself may disagree with this implication. 
20 For the purposes of this argument, I remain deliberately agnostic on whether these motivations are 
evaluative preferences, brute desires, or some other mental spring for action. Critics may worry that this 
agnosticism oversimplifies a series of important distinctions in debates over the philosophy of action. 
Regrettably, discussion of these distinctions falls beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say, my 
argument should apply to any mental phenomena that is capable of authenticity (in the sense described) 
and that is capable of motivating wilful action. 
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Consequently, we must also provide our fellow citizens with the opportunities that they 
need to pursue their conceptions of the good. We cannot force them to act in this way 
without undermining the value of autonomous motivation itself. However, failure to 
provide these opportunities would disfigure the concept of personal autonomy by 
severing it from its source of value. The state cannot go beyond or fall short of this 
standard. This is the tightrope that the autonomy-respecting state must walk when 
providing opportunities for autonomous actions to its citizens. 
 
A failure to promote the capacity to form and revise our conception of the good without 
also providing particular opportunities to successfully pursue that conception of the good 
wrongs autonomous agents in two distinctive ways:  
 
First, it constitutes an expressive failure to acknowledge and respond to the source of 
autonomy’s value. It does this by displaying a troubling form of thoughtlessness - a failure 
to live up to the categorical requirements of acknowledging the status of our fellow 
citizens as autonomous agents (Green 2010, p. 222). Let us call this the Acknowledgement 
objection.  
 
Second, it threatens to actively frustrate the relationship of authentic motivation that 
gives personal autonomy its value. It does this by providing us with the ability to do 
something valuable without providing us with the opportunity to act in this valuable 
manner. If the current opportunities for pursuing our conceptions of the good are found 
lacking, then we will be unable to employ those capacities in meaningful ways (Raz 1986, 
pp. 407-12).21 Let us call this the Frustration objection. 
 
Together, these objections explain why Capacity Without Success arguments do a worse 
job of recognising and responding to the valuable motivational profile of autonomous 
action than Capacity & Success arguments. Capacity Without Success fails to correctly 
                                                          
21 See also Wall 1996, pp. 205-33; Colburn 2010, pp. 69-77. 
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respond to this value because it removes important protections of valuable successful 
autonomous behaviour that Capacity & Success provides.  
 
4.2 Autonomy and Perfectionism 
 
In the previous section, I argued that Capacity & Success conceptions of respect for the 
value of personal autonomy are better suited to their task than Capacity Without Success 
conceptions. What remains to be shown is how Capacity & Success conceptions generate 
perfectionist principles. Critics may accept that respecting the value of personal 
autonomy requires us to help others to pursue the goals that reflect their authentic 
commitments and conceptions of the good, but they may query how this duty establishes 
perfectionist political principles. Perfectionism is the promotion or discouragement of 
particular opportunities due to their intrinsic value. How does a commitment to this 
political principle follow from accepting that respect for autonomy requires a success 
condition? 
 
The link between success conditions and perfectionism can be found in Inseparability. As 
we saw in §2.1, the most prominent reason to accept perfectionism is that our everyday 
reasons for action combine moral and ethical notions as they flow from incommensurable 
competitively plural objective values. This is a conceptual claim concerning our process 
of practical reasoning – we want to live lives that we believe are good and moral. It 
suggests, negatively, that we have no prima facie reason to avoid perfectionism. Further, 
it suggests more positively that our everyday reasons for action give us reason to support 
perfectionism; justice and the good life are entwined. In an important sense, 
perfectionism accepts our practical reasoning for what it is – a complex blend of the right 
and the good.  
 
If this claim is plausible (as perfectionists assume) then it informs Capacity & Success in 
the following way: According to Inseparability, agents pursue what they believe to be 
valuable and have good reasons to do so in a moral fashion. Thus, the right and the good 
blend together in our everyday pursuit of value in a way that makes them difficult to 
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separate. This means that there is often no clear distinction between the right and the 
good within our conceptions of the good. If respect for our autonomy requires us to enjoy 
both the capacity and opportunity to succeed in acting autonomously (Capacity & 
Success), and our authentic conceptions of the good contain comprehensive ethical claims 
(Inseparability), then respect for autonomy requires us to help others pursue their 
authentic conceptions of the good regardless of the comprehensive nature of that 
conception.22  
 
This argument provides the final link in a chain that derives support for perfectionist 
policies from autonomy. Respect for personal autonomy requires others to help us 
pursue our authentic conceptions of the good (or else risking Acknowledgement and 
Frustration). Our conceptions of the good reference both the right and the good 
(Inseparability), so the autonomy-respecting state has a reason to promote autonomy-
compatible ways of life to facilitate citizens in their autonomous pursuit of the good. Put 
another way, perfectionists defend state support for valuable but reasonably 
controversial legislative policies. I have shown that such policies can be motivated by 
Capacity & Success conceptions of respect for the value of personal autonomy because the 
conditions for successful autonomous behaviour require the presence of opportunities to 
pursue such behaviour as we conceive of it (i.e. regardless of the comprehensive 
controversial nature of that conception).  
 
Therefore, if liberals accept that the legitimate state should respect citizens as free and 
equal autonomous agents, then they should accept Capacity & Success and its resulting 
moderate perfectionism grounded in the value of personal autonomy. Respecting 
personal autonomy with a success condition supports moderately perfectionist policies. 
                                                          
22 Important questions arise here concerning whether this view must support autonomy-constraining or 
heteronomous pursuits. The answer to this question partly depends on how we answer certain structural 
questions concerning the nature of personal autonomy (e.g. whether it is a procedural, substantive, or 
hybrid concept). Each of these views will permit different types of constraints and identify different 
pursuits as heteronomous. My argument concerns the value (rather than the structure) of personal 
autonomy. As a result, it is intentionally agnostic on this point. Further, answering this question will depend 
on how we weight autonomy against other competing political values (in order to determine how much 
heteronomy is permissible). Again, this task falls beyond the scope of my current argument, which seeks to 
establish the costs of this weighting rather than the final outcome of such a process, which may differ from 
state to state. I thank an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to answer this question. 
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The need for a success condition, in turn, flows from the need to avoid frustrating the 
relationship of authentic motivation that gives autonomy its value.  
 
In summary, this argument takes the following form: 
 
1. The legitimate liberal state respects the autonomy of its citizens. 
 
2. Citizens possess the capacity for personal autonomy. 
 
3. Personal autonomy derives its value from a particular type of motivation that is 
authentic to our will and our conception of the good. 
 
4. Respecting personal autonomy’s motivational profile requires facilitating success in 
our pursuit of our authentic conception of the good. 
 
5. We do not commonly distinguish between the right and the good when forming our 
conception of the good. 
 
6. Thus, respect for the value of personal autonomy gives us a presumptive reason in 
favour of helping others succeed in pursuing their conception of the good regardless of 
the comprehensive content of that conception. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The argument outlined in §4 generates an important conclusion from an uncontroversial 
premise – perfectionists can argue that the demands of liberal legitimacy require the 
liberal state to respect the personal autonomy of citizens and this requirement generates 
a reason to favour moderate perfectionism. They can appeal to the framework set out in 
24 
 
the first-half of this paper to argue that it is more difficult for Capacity Without Success 
conceptions of autonomy, such as those favoured by anti-perfectionists, to satisfy the 
requirements of liberal legitimacy. By narrowing Justification to the realm of public 
reason, anti-perfectionists only partially satisfy Recognition and Voluntarism when these 
conditions are understood in a way that reflects the most plausible understanding of the 
value of personal autonomy. The priority of the right over the good, and its resulting 
censure of Inseparability leads anti-perfectionists to acknowledge the capacity for 
autonomy without doing enough to acknowledge the value of that capacity. Anti-
perfectionism fails to capture all of the morally relevant dependent reasons that a liberal 
account of legitimacy should pre-empt.  
 
Responding to the impasse in this manner generates a fresh argument in favour of 
perfectionism that is sensitive to the distinctive value of personal autonomy. This 
argument is less controversial than traditional defences of liberal perfectionism as it does 
not rely on Social Forms or Contingent Value.23 Further, this argument is more persuasive 
to liberals as it grounds its support for perfectionism in autonomy rather than objective 
value. Liberal sceptics of perfectionism should be more sympathetic to the former than 
the latter. Finally, this argument goes further to engage with anti-perfectionists by 
identifying a cost with anti-perfectionism and reframing this cost in opposition to the 
reasons in favour of perfectionism. 
 
Anti-perfectionists may answer this challenge by either: i) denying that respecting 
personal autonomy requires a success condition (e.g. by rejecting autonomy’s 
motivational profile), ii) denying that respecting personal autonomy to this degree is 
incompatible with securing political autonomy (e.g. by showing that the burdens of 
judgement are compatible with moderate perfectionism), or iii) biting the bullet and 
explaining why securing political autonomy is worth failing to adequately respect the 
value of personal autonomy.  
 
                                                          
23 This is an important benefit. For example, Contingent Value often plays an important role in rejections of 
liberal perfectionism (e.g. Lecce 2008, p. 130; Quong 2011, p. 60). 
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The first two responses simply reject the above argument. If we set these responses aside 
then we are left with the third option. Anti-perfectionists may respond to my argument 
by accepting its main points and replying that securing political autonomy in the face of 
the burdens of judgement is more important than allowing citizens to enjoy the 
comprehensive ethical value of a personally autonomous life. This response should not 
surprise us as it follows quite naturally from anti-perfectionism’s rejection of the 
comprehensive ethical value of personal autonomy. Liberals who favour this rejection 
must be willing to pay the price of doing so. However, this response threatens to create a 
new version of the impasse. For this reason, it is worth briefly indulging at this late stage. 
 
In order to justify this trade-off, anti-perfectionists require a further principled moral 
reason to separate the right from the good in political discourse other than respect for 
personal autonomy.24 Likely contenders for this role are the importance of living in a 
reciprocal and stable political society.25 Institutions that citizens endorse (via public 
reasoning) are likely to persist over time even under conditions of reasonable pluralism. 
This endorsement allows the state to fulfil the conditions of democratic legitimacy 
despite the burdens of judgement, and this fulfilment is worth the cost of failing to respect 
personal autonomy to the fullest degree.  
 
On this view, anti-perfectionists may object that perfectionist states are unable to secure 
endorsement for the right reasons because some citizens reasonably object to the state 
supporting valuable ways of life. Citizens may reasonably disagree about whether they 
are subject to perfectionist duties to aid others in pursuing objectively valuable ends and 
may reasonably disagree about whether those duties (if they do exist) should play a major 
role in politics. This disagreement will lead some citizens to favour stability and political 
autonomy over the comprehensive value of personal autonomy. This preference would 
then lead them to reasonably reject the liberal perfectionist state’s claim to legitimacy by 
rejecting the existence of the foundational perfectionist duties that perfectionist liberals 
take for granted. 
                                                          
24 To rely on the latter as a justificatory reason would return critics to the prior objections. 
25 These concerns are captured by Rawls’ famous pursuit of free-standing principles of justice that are 
capable of securing endorsement ‘for the right reasons’ (Rawls 2005, p. 391) and the belief that citizens are 
more likely to support institutions that they judge to be just (Rawls 2005, pp. 140-4). 
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If anti-perfectionists are to take this route to reject liberal perfectionism as illegitimate 
on the grounds of stability, they must explain why stability is so important to legitimacy 
that it cannot be traded off against, and must trump, other considerations (such as respect 
for personal autonomy). Further, they must show why they are justified in holding 
perfectionism to a higher standard of stability than anti-perfectionism, or else show that 
they are holding perfectionism to the same standard as their own, that this standard is 
the correct one, and that anti-perfectionism better satisfies this standard. In short, they 
must explain precisely what type of endorsement matters to stability, and show that 
perfectionism is incapable of generating the required endorsement.26 
 
In the absence of this type of response, my argument goes some way toward levelling the 
playing field between the two branches of liberalism by suggesting a problem for anti-
perfectionists. I have offered a significant moral objection against the plausibility of anti-
perfectionism that does not rely on the brute assumption that controversial perfectionist 
duties exist and are relevant to politics. Anti-perfectionists deny this assumption and so 
such arguments are unpersuasive. Rather, I have moved beyond the traditional impasse 
to show that a compelling account of respect for the value of personal autonomy supports 
moderate perfectionism in politics. Liberals of all stripes accept that this value has at least 
some role to play in politics and so should find this argument (and the costs that it 
identifies) more persuasive.  
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